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ABSTRACT 
This research paper compares two pieces of legislation, the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK) and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The aim of the 
research was to discover whether lessons had been learned from and 
improvements made on the perceived failures and successes of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 or whether the same problems would exist under the 
new UK legislation. 
The paper argues that much the same results have been achieved in the new 
legislation with only a few minor improvements in some areas. It also suggests 
that a better approach for the United Kingdom in achieving its aim of retaining 
parliamentary sovereignty while at the same time protecting fundamental rights 
and :freedoms may have been to follow the approach of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page and footnotes) comprises 
approximately 14,400 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Constitutional reform is difficult for nations to undertake in peaceful times. 1 
Around the world, new constitutions and bills of rights have generally accompanied 
cataclysmic events such as revolutions and civil wars, or other epochal moments in a 
nation's history such as grants of independence. In ordinary times, bills of rights 
struggle to capture the imagination of citizens immersed in the mundane routine of 
daily life. 
The idea of 'fundamental rights' and of a 'fundamental' constitutional law, 
taking precedence over ordinary laws, became eclipsed at the end of the 
seventeenth century by the concept of absolute parliamentary sovereignty. 
According to traditional, post-seventeenth century English political and legal 
theory, since Parliament is sovereign, the subject cannot possess fundamental 
rights. There are no rights that are fundamental in the sense that they enjoy 
special constitutional protection against interference by Parliament. The surest 
and most effective safeguards of human rights, in the opinion of Albert Venn 
Dicey and Sir Ivor Jennings, are not the rigid leg~lism and paper guarantees of 
written constitutions and Bills of Rights but the benevolent exercise of 
administrative discretion by public officials, acting as platonic guardians of the 
public interest, accountable through their political masters to the legislature and 
the people. Until recently, the effective safeguards against the misuse of public 
powers were regarded as being not legally enforceable safeguards but malleable 
constitutional conventions; the sense of fair play of Ministers and the 
professional integrity of civil servants in exercising their broad powers; the 
vigilance of the Opposition and of individual Members of Parliament; the 
influence of a free and vigorous press and a well-informed public opinion; and 
the periodic opportunity of changing the government through free elections and 
secret ballots. It is this state of mind in the corridors of power that has 
1 P Rishworth "The Birth and the Rebirth of the Bill of Rights" in G Huscroft and P Rishworth (eds) 
Rights and Freedoms (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 1. 
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underpinned the refusal by successive British governments to introduce 
legislation to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into UK 
law. 
As explained by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the Preface to the White 
Paper Bringing Rights Home, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) is intended to 
"give people in the United Kingdom opportunities to enforce their rights under 
the European Convention in British courts rather than having to incur the cost 
and delay of taking a case to the European Human Rights . . . Court in 
Strasbourg"2• The White Paper added that the aim of the legislation "is a 
straightforward one. It is to make more directly accessible the rights which the 
British people already enjoy under the Convention. In other words, to bring 
those rights home"3• 
As part of the debate in Britain over the introduction of a bill of rights and the 
compatibility of such a bill with parliamentary sovereignty, quite some attention 
has been paid to the New Zealand Bill of Rights. Lord Woolf of Barnes 
strongly praised the New Zealand Bill as a model worthy of serious 
consideration in the United Kingdom. His Lordship commented4 
But what about the sovereignty of Parliament? Some of those who are opposed to a 
Bill of Rights see it as a threat to that sovereignty. There are, however, different 
forms that a Bill of Rights can take. I have referred earlier to the New Zealand Bill (of 
Rights Act 1990). That Bill seems to me to provide an ideal precedent for a Bill of 
Rights in this country since it is in accord with our democratic and parliamentary 
traditions ... 
Having quoted section 6 of the Bill of Rights about consistent interpretations 
being preferred, his Lordship continued, 
2 Rights Brought Home (Cm 3782, 1997) p l. 
3 Rights Brought Home (Cm 3782, 1997) para l.19. 
4 Lord Woolfof Barnes, "Droit Public-English Style" [l 995] PL 57 at 70-71. 
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Subject to this, legislation is not affected. Parliament retains the right to state that it 
intends to exclude the fundamental rights, but if it fails to do this, those fundamental 
rights are part of any legislation passed by Parliament. This seems to be a satisfactory 
compromise to which all should be able to subscribe. My New Zealand colleagues 
say it works well. It is not subject to the excesses of which some complain in the case 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights. 
A The White Paper Proposal for a Bill of Rights 
The White Paper A Bill of Rights for New Zealand was released in April 1985, 
with an introduction by the then Minister of Justice, Mr Geoffrey Palmer. It 
was tabled and referred to the Justice and Law Reform Committee for 
consideration and receipt of public submissions. The proposed legislation was to 
be entrenched and clause 1 of the Bill declared it to be supreme law. "This Bill 
of Rights is the supreme law of New Zealand and accordingly any law 
(including existing law) inconsistent with this Bill shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency be of no effect". 
Public reaction to the Bill of Rights proposal was muted. Most New Zealanders 
were uninterested. But while that could have been anticipated, what really 
counted was the negative reaction of individuals and bodies who chose to make 
submissions. "There were, it seems, many more reasons to oppose a bill of 
rights than to support one"5• The principal ground of opposition was to the idea 
of a higher law bill of rights which would vest in judges the power to review 
and to strike down legislation for inconsistency. 
By early 1987 it was clear that there was no great enthusiasm in any quarter for 
the White Paper draft. The Select Committee's Interim Report to that effect in 
July 1987, therefore came as no surprise6• The report began by noting that the 
Committee was disappointed with the level of debate. "It would be fair to say" 
5 P Rishworth "The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of Rights" in G Huscroft and P Rishworth (eds) 
Rights and Freedoms (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 15. 
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said the Committee ''that the concept of a Bill of Rights has not yet gripped the 
imagination of the wider public ofNew Zealand"7• 
By December 1987 it was well known that public opinion was against the 
proposed Bill of Rights. Around that time Mr Palmer indicated the possibility 
of introducing the Bill of Rights as an ordinary statute which would not be 
entrenched as supreme law. The Select Committee's final report on the White 
Paper proposal was tabled in October 1988. The Committee concluded that the 
Bill of Rights proposal should not lapse8• Nonetheless, it was considered 
necessary to adopt a fairly cautious approach. The Committee recommended 
the introduction of a Bill of Rights which was an ordinary statute, not supreme 
law, and not entrenched. 
B The New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill 
The Bill was drafted in 1989 and introduced in October of that year. The 
adjustments to reflect the statutory status of the Bill were, essentially, the 
deletion of the provisions about entrenchment, and the elevation of the White 
Paper's clause 23 about favouring consistent interpretations of legislation to 
nearer the beginning, to clause 5. The "reasonable limits" provision remained. 
A new clause 6 was added setting out the Attorney-General's role in reporting 
apparent inconsistencies in newly introduced bills. The remedies clause in the 
White Paper draft was deleted. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill was introduced on 10 October 1989 by the 
Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer who was by this time Prime Minister. It was referred 
to the Justice and Law Reform Committee and submissions were called for by 
early December 1989. When the Bill was reported back to the House, 
6 Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into the White Paper: A Bill of 
Rights for New 'Zealand ( I 987) AJHR I 8A. 
7 Above n I. 
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significant alterations had been made to the Bill. First, the word "only" had 
been added to clause 3, so making it clear that the Bill of Rights was to apply 
"only" to government and public actors. This pre-empted any argument that the 
Bill of Rights was intended to apply to private individuals and that the former 
clause 3 had merely served to make it clear that it applied to government as 
well. (As it turns out there is proving, nonetheless, to be some controversy 
about whether the Bill of Rights applies to private litigation in any event, on the 
grounds that it binds judges as to how they should decide that litigation)9. 
A second addition was a new clause 3A which became section 4 of the Bill of 
Rights as enacted. This clause was a response to a matter raised in submissions 
to the Select Committee suggesting that even as an ordinary statute, the effect of 
the Bill of Rights may well have been taken by the courts to override all 
inconsistent legislation. The new clause provided: 
Other enactments not affected - No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether 
passed or made before or after the commencement of this Bill ofRights)-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be 
in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights. 
A consequential amendment was made to s5, which now read: 
Justified limitations - Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
8 Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for 
New 'Zealand ( 1988) AJHR I 8C. 
9 Andrew Butler, "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Private Common Law Litigation" [1991] 
NZLJ 261. 
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The Bill of Rights was reported back to the House on 17 July 1990. Mr Bill 
Dillon, Chairman of the Select Committee, canvassed the history of the proposal 
beginning with the 1985 White Paper, noting that the level of opposition to the 
new Bill had dropped dramatically. 10 Opposition member Paul East indicated 
that the Opposition remained opposed both to the White Paper proposal and to 
the "watered down" version before the House. Mr East called it a "Clayton's 
Bill of Rights" 11 because it was not enforceable; it was "meaningless". Further, 
the Opposition objected to the new Bill because it was "an attempt to introduce 
in the long term, by stealth, a full-scale Bill of Rights". "In other words", said 
Mr East, "the Bill is a Trojan Horse" 12• 
The Second Reading Debate took place on 14 August 1990. The Rt Hon 
Geoffrey Palmer moved the second reading, and to pre-empt what he had 
regarded the first time round as misguided opposition speeches, he gave first a 
summary of what the Bill of Rights would not do (empower judges to strike 
down legislation, grant citizens the right to sue each other, empower judges to 
grant new remedies 13). But the Bill of Rights was again attacked by the 
Opposition on the basis that it was a precursor to ultimate entrenchment of a 
Bill of Rights. That, argued Mr Graham, was inappropriate when people had 
rejected the White Paper proposal: a better interpretation of the peoples' view 
was that there should be no bill of rights at all. 
The third reading debate took place on 21 August 1990. The Prime Minister 
again outlined its history and the fact that it had attracted much less opposition 
the second time round. It was he said "an extraordinarily useful addition to the 
constitutional structure". Again, Mr East attacked it as a "Clayton's Bill of 
10 1990 NZPD 2798, 2799. 
11 The term "Clayton's" was applied to the NZBORA 1990 on many occasions, notably by Paul 
East. It is a reference to an advertising slogan for Clayton ' s, a non-alcoholic drink: "the drink you 
have when you are not having a drink". 
12 1990 NZPD 3460 (second reading debate) 3761 (third reading debate). 
13 But see Simpson v Attorney-Genera/ (Baigent 's Case) - discussed later. 
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Rights" and a "Trojan Horse"14, which was both an attempt to salvage 
something from the wreckage of the White Paper and a precursor to something 
stronger. And once again Mr Graham attacked the Bill as a measure 
demonstrably unwanted by the public. Since it would achieve nothing, its only 
significance lay in its serving to bring about an entrenched Bill of Rights, and as 
the people had rejected that type of Bill of Rights there was no mandate to enact 
even an ordinary one. 15 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights was then read for a third time, after a vote in 
favour of 36 to 28. It received the Royal Assent on August 28 1990, and by 
virtue of section 1 came into effect 28 days later, on 25 September 1990. 
II PRE-ENACTMENT SCRUTINY 
Pre-enactment scrutiny is an important issue for an "ordinary statute" Bill of 
Rights. It aims to provide an effective safeguard for ensuring that rights and 
freedoms are protected. Section 7 of the Bill of Rights requires the Attorney-
General to "bring to the attention of the House o: Representatives any provision 
in ... [a] Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms 
contained in . .. [the] Bill of Rights". In the case of Government Bills, the 
Attorney-General must alert the House to apparent inconsistency with the Bill 
of Rights on the introduction of the Bill. In relation to any other Bill, the 
Attorney-General must do so as soon as possible after introduction. The 
obvious intent is to highlight inconsistencies in proposed legislation at the 
earliest possible stage. In Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General, 16 
section 7 was described as a procedural "safeguard designed to alert members of 
Parliament to legislation which may give rise to an inconsistency and 
accordingly to enable them to debate the proposals on that basis" 17• In that case 
14 1990 NZPD 3761-3762. 
15 1990 NZPD 3765-3766. 
16 (1994) 2 NZLR 451. 
17 (1994) 2 NZLR451 , 457. 
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the High Court rejected a challenge to legislation where the Attorney-General 
had failed to report the alleged inconsistency to Parliament. Section 7 can be 
seen as a particularly important safeguard in light of the decision not to press for 
entrenchment of the Bill of Rights. 
The Attorney-General has established a procedure for scrutinising all legislative 
proposals in order to meet the requirements of section 7. Parliamentary Counsel 
are directed to send copies of all Government Bills to the Ministry of Justice to 
be vetted by an officer in the Legal Services Group. In the case of Bills 
promoted by the Ministry of Justice, those are sent to the Crown Law Office for 
vetting to avoid any perception of conflict of interest. 
Where the Bill is not a Government Bill, the Ministry of Justice is required to 
examine it for consistency as soon as possible. The officer conducting the 
examination is required to report to the Attorney-General and the Chief 
Parliamentary Counsel on whether or not the Bill contains any provisions which 
appear to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. So far, the Attorney-General 
has followed the advice of his officials, and has not added any comment to the 
reports of apparent inconsistency he has received from them. Where the 
officials have advised that there is no apparent inconsistency, the Attorney-
General has often claimed legal professional privilege to prevent release of the 
advice. Reports of apparent inconsistency issued by the Attorney-Genera~ in 
contrast, are publicly available documents, tabled in the House and later 
published in the Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives. 
Requests for access to the underlying advice from officials is routinely granted. 
The Attorney-General must bring to the attention of the House any provision in 
a Bill which "appears" to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. The practice 
of the Attorney-General has been to report when it appears that any 
infringement of a right cannot be justified in terms of section 5, which 
authorises such reasonable limitations on rights as are justifiable in a free and 
11 
democratic society. The possibility exists, however, that the Attorney-General 
might incorrectly interpret a right or fail to apply the section 5 balancing test 
properly, so that no report is made when it should have been, or a potentially 
inconsistent provision might simply be overlooked in the legislative process. 
The requirement in the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) of a statement of 
compatibility or otherwise in relation to every Bill is an improvement on the 
New Zealand procedure. Section 19 of the Human Rights Act states: 
(1) A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament must, 
before Second Reading of the Bill -
(a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are 
compatible with the Convention rights ('a statement of compatibility') ; or 
(b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement of 
compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill 
(2) The statement must be in writing and be published in such manner as the Minister 
making it considers appropriate. 
A major difference between the New Zealand pre-enactment scrutiny and that in 
the Human Rights Act is in the identity, qualifications and responsibilities of the 
person assessing compatibility. In New Zealand the Attorney-General is not 
only the Chief Law Officer of the Crown, but also almost invariably a member 
of Cabinet 18 • According to convention the Attorney-General is a lawyer and, 
notwithstanding membership of Cabinet, in theory and practice must exercise 
independent judgement in matters such as section 7 review. The involvement of 
the Chief Law Officer has advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side 
is the expertise and independent-mindedness the Chief Law Officer brings to the 
task, which adds greatly to the moral persuasiveness of those views on the 
House. On the negative side is the undignified sight - as has occurred in New 
Zealand - of the House disregarding or rejecting the view of the Attorney-
General on inconsistency. It is relevant to note that the Parliamentary Select 
18 Huscroft, 'The Attorney-General, the Bill of Rights, and the Public Interest'' in G Huscroft and P 
Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brookers, Wellington, I 995) 133. 
12 
Committee which recommended proceeding with the Bill of Rights proposal as 
an ordinary statute, also recommended the creation of a special select committee 
to examine all bills and regulations for consistency with the Bill of Rights. 
Geoffrey Palmer championed instead the Attorney-General's role. Placing the 
role of monitoring for consistency in the hands of a member of the Executive 
branch was described as "akin to leaving the fox to guard the henhouse"19. 
Under the Human Rights Act the Minister in charge of a Bill in either House 
must make a statement of compatibility or otherwise in relation to every Bill. It 
is clear from section 19(1 )(b) that, while the Minister is required to express a 
personal view on (in)compatibility, it is ultimately for the Government to decide 
whether to proceed with any Bill. However, the absence from the Human 
Rights Act of a consistent, expert and independent voice on (in)compatibility 
may be a problem, especially in view of the opinion that "the existing [British] 
arrangements for ensuring that legislation complies with the European 
Convention are uncertain, unsatisfactory and ineffective"20• 
Without any indication of how the existing processes are to be strengthened to 
give Ministers and Ministries competent, non-partisan and independent advice, 
there appears to be a real risk of the inadequacies of the present system 
continuing. If this is the case, the benefits of pre-enactment scrutiny will fail to 
materialise. The New Zealand experience so far has been that, despite the best 
efforts of the Attorney-General, apparently infringing legislation has been 
introduced on occasion without attracting section 7 comment. Nevertheless, the 
custom of giving reasoned reports to the House is now affirmed in the new 
Standing Orders. No doubt, this is implicitly required by section 19 of the 
Human Rights Act also. A ministerial statement of (in)compatibility without 
further elaboration would hardly fulfill the statutory purpose. 
19 Huscroft, "The Attorney-General, the Bill of Rights, and the Public Interest" in G Huscroft and P 
Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 
20 D Kinley, "The European Convention on Human Rights: Compliance Without Incorporation" 
(Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1993) 134. 
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Pre-enactment scrutiny is, however, not some sort of panacea. It is impossible 
to foresee many future Convention breaches by merely examining the general 
principles of the Convention and often broadly drafted proposed legislation. 
Nevertheless, pre-enactment scrutiny has its proper place in a Bill of Rights 
scheme, especially one which purports to preserve parliamentary sovereignty, 
and it is questionable whether the Human Rights Act makes adequate provision 
in this regard. 
III INTERPRETATION 
One of the principal objectives of an "ordinary statute" bill of rights is to direct 
judges (and others) how to interpret legislation. Both the Bill of Rights and the 
Human Rights Act do this. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states: 
Interpretation consistent with bill of rights to be preferred - Wherever an enactment 
can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning. 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act directs: 
Interpretation of legislation 
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in way which is compatible with the Convention rights. 
(2) This section -
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted; 
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible primary legislation; and 
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of revocation) 
primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility. 
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Subsection (2) makes it clear that this direction extends to future as well as 
existing legislation, but that it does not entail the power to invalidate, hold 
inoperative or refuse to enforce primary and subordinate legislation. 
To similar effect is section 4 of the Bill of Rights, which was inserted to head 
off the predictable argument that the "ordinary statute" Bill of Rights would 
impliedly repeal any infringing legislation in force on the day the Bill of Rights 
came into force and the bolder argument that an "ordinary statute" affirming 
human rights could override post-Bill of Rights legislation which did not 
expressly exclude the Bill of Rights. Section 4 of the Bill of Rights states: 
Other enactments not affe<.:ted..:.. No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether 
passed or made before or after the commencement of this Bill ofRights)-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be 
in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights. 
Up to this point the Bill of Rights and the Human Rights Act are more or less 
symmetrical. Unfortunately, it is not as simple as that. The White Paper 
entrenched version of the Bill of Rights preferred the model of limiting rights 
and freedoms in the Canadian Charter (setting out a single limitation provision 
applicable to all the rights and freedoms) to that of the European Convention 
(stating specific limitations attached to each right). The White Paper version 
also contained an interpretation provision, which is the forerunner to section 6 
in the "ordinary statute" Bill of Rights. This provision has no counterpart in the 
Canadian Charter. In the White Paper entrenched version of the Bill of Rights 
the role of this provision was to affirm the standard constitutional presumption 
of constitutionality, which requires the courts to endeavour first to overcome 
apparent inconsistency by interpretative means, and only if that fails is the 
power to invalidate legislation exercised as a remedy of last resort. When the 
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White Paper entrenched version was abandoned and the "ordinary statute" Bill 
of Rights emerged, the generic limitation clause (section 5) and the 
interpretation clause (section 6) were put together side by side. The 
interrelationship between the two provisions was and still is a little uncertain. 
The principal uncertainty was whether the phrase ''the rights and freedoms in 
this Bill of Rights" referred to the absolute rights provided in Part II of the Bill 
of Rights (ss8-27) or those rights as reasonably limited by the prior application 
of section 5 (which also employed the phrase ''the rights and freedoms in this 
Bill of Rights"). This was compounded by the late introduction of section 4 and 
the consequential amendment to section 5, making it "subject to section 4 of the 
Bill of Rights". This has created the so-called sections 4-5-6 puzzle. The Court 
of Appeal discussed the issue in the Noort case and more recently in Moonen v 
Film and Literature Board of Review. 
A The Noort Case 
This case concerned s23( 1 )(b) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990: the right of 
arrested and detained persons to consult and instr..ict lawyers and to be advised 
of that right. In the Noort situation the appellant was stopped by a Ministry of 
Transport enforcement officer and requested to undergo a breath screening test 
pursuant to section 58A of the Transport Act 1962. The test was positive. The 
appellant was then required to accompany the enforcement officer to the police 
station to undergo an evidential breath test pursuant to section 58B of the 
Transport Act 1962. That test gave a reading well in excess of the statutory 
limit. The appellant declined the option of undergoing a blood test. He was 
charged and convicted of driving with excess breath alcohol. 
In the Curran situation, the appellant was also asked to undergo a breath 
screening test. He refused. He was then required to accompany an enforcement 
officer to undergo an evidential breath test. He agreed to accompany the officer 
but at the testing station refused to undergo an evidential breath test. He was 
then required to permit the taking of a blood specimen. He made a phone call to 
his father who advised him to give a specimen. The appellant apparently then 
agreed to give a blood specimen, but the enforcement officer had formed the 
opinion that the appellant had refused and charged him (under section 58E(l) of 
the Transport Act) with the offence of refusing to permit the taking of a blood 
specimen. Both appellants argued that the right to counsel under section 
23(1)(b) of the Bill ofRights had been breached. 
The ultimate issue was whether the provisions in the Transport Act ousted or 
limited the right to a lawyer. The Act did neither of these things expressly; it 
said nothing about access to legal advice at all. But the Crown's argument was 
that its "operating requirements", that is, the need to get the tests done quickly 
so that they were close to the time of driving and to get officers back on the 
roads on patrol, implied that access to legal advice was intended by the 
legislation to be abrogated. The result of the case in the Court of Appeal was 
clear: detained persons must be told of their right to a lawyer and afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to contact one, generally by telephone. There was some 
limitation on the right: only a reasonable time could be allowed before testing 
was resumed, and this would preclude attendances of lawyers in person in all 
but atypical cases where the contacted lawyer was nearby. 
But the reasoning of the five judges differed significantly, and those differences 
revolved around the interplay between ss 4, 5, and 6 of the Bill of Rights. The 
case showed that these sections did not sit well together, and that this was not a 
mere technical problem but one raising important issues about the relationship 
intended between the Courts and Parliament. Richardson J and Hardie Boys J 
took the view that:21 
. . . s4 falls for consideration only where following the application of s5 and s6 there is 
a necessary inconsistency between the other statute and the particular provision of the 
21 [1990-92) I NZBORR 97, 158. 
17 
Bill of Rights even as modified in its application by s5 and after seeking to apply s6, 
in which case the other statute prevails over the Bill of Rights to the extent of the 
remaining inconsistencies. 
The Part I sections, particularly ss 4, 5, and 6, must be read as a whole. Only then, I 
think, is the true significance of s5, otherwise a difficult provision, apparent. It is 
plainly Parliament' s intention that the rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill should 
be upheld unless there is clear legislative intention to the contrary. The direction 
given by s6 may not always be sufficient for this purpose. Section 6 is directed to the 
meaning of the other enactment, and does not permit any limitation or qualification of 
the Bill's rights and freedoms. It rather treats them as absolutes, and so, on its own, 
could allow quite wide scope for the application of s4. Yet there must be many a 
statute which can be read consistently with the Bill ' s rights and freedoms if it is 
accepted that the statute has imposed some limit or qualification upon them; in other 
words, that although the statute cannot be given a meaning consistent with the Bill' s 
rights and freedoms in their entirety, it can be given a meaning consistent with them in 
a limited or abridged form. It is obviously consistent with the spirit and purpose of 
the Bill of Rights Act that such a meaning should be adopted rather than that s4 should 
apply so that the rights and freedoms are excluded altogether. 
Cooke P, however, took a different approach: 22 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights is a provision of substance stating when the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill may acceptably be made subject to limits. However, it 
does not appear on its face to lay down a rule for interpreting other enactments. 
Further, since s5 is subject to s4 of the Bill of Rights, if an enactment is inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights, that enactment prevails and the Courts are not 
concerned with s5. Section 5 is not of legitimate concern to the Courts once an 
enactment is clearly inconsistent with any of the freedoms set out in Part II of the Bill 
of Rights . .. no question under s5 arises for consideration. 
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights is one of the key features of the Bill of Rights, in that it 
means that in interpreting an enactment a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights is 
to be preferred to any other meaning. In the context of s6, a strained meaning cannot 
(1990-92] I NZBORR 97, 164. 
22 (1990-92] I NZBORR 97, 143. 
[1990-92] I NZBORR 97, 145. 
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be given to the other enactment; the enactment must be capable of reasonably being 
given a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights. Moreover, as regards the 
interrelationship between ss 5 and 6, the question W1der s6 is not whether a meaning 
consistent with the whole of the Bill of Rights (including s5) is open, but rather 
whether a meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms mentioned in Part 11 is 
open. 
B The Moonen Case 
This case concerned the relationship between freedom of expression and 
censorship of objectionable publications under the Films, Videos and 
Publications Classification Act 1993 (''the Act"). The appellant (Mr Moonen) 
appealed to the High Court from the decision of the Film and Literature Review 
Board determining that a book called The Seventh Acolyte Reader and various 
photographs were objectionable in terms of the Act. He argued that the 
definition of "objectionable" in s3 of the Act violated the freedoms of thought 
and expression contained in ss 13 and 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. The 
Film and Literature Review Board, which initially reviewed the decision not to 
allow publication of the appellant's book, relied on the High Court decision in 
News Media Limited v Film and Literature Board of Review23 which stated 
that:24 
Bill of Rights considerations do not take matters further .... The restrictive provisions 
of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 are inconsistent with 
that sl4 freedom, to the extent of the limits they place upon it, and are predominant by 
virtue of s4. Thus despite sl4, censorship within the law prevails and the 
interpretation directions of s6 do not arise. 
In the High Court, Gendall J also followed the decision in the News Media case, 
and the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal with the principle submission 
to the effect that the Board and the High Court had been led astray by erroneous 
observations of the Full Court in the News Media case. The Court of Appeal 
23 Unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, AP 197/96. 
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used this case as an opportunity to express its views on the correct application 
of ss 4, 5, and 6 of the Bill of Rights. The Court set out a five-step approach. 
Step One: After determining the scope of the relevant right or freedom, 
identify the different interpretations of the words of the other Act which are 
properly open. If only one meaning is properly open that meaning must be 
adopted. 
Step Two: If more than one meaning is available, identify the meaning which 
constitutes the least possible limitation on the right or freedom in question. It is 
that meaning which s6 of the Bill of Rights, aided by s5, requires the Court to 
adopt. 
Step Three: Having adopted the appropriate meaning, identify the extent, if 
any, to which that meaning limits the relevant right or freedom. 
Step Four: Consider whether the extent of any such limitation, as found, can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in terms of s5. If the 
limitation cannot be so justified, there is an inconsistency with the Bill of 
Rights; but, by dint of s4, the inconsistent statutory provision nevertheless 
stands and must be given effect. In determining whether an abrogation or 
limitation of a right or freedom can be justified in terms of s5, it is desirable first 
to identify the objective which the legislature was endeavouring to achieve by 
the provision in question. The importance and significance of that objective 
must then be assessed. The way in which the objective is statutorily achieved 
must be in reasonable proportion to the importance of the objective. The means 
used must also have a rational relationship with the objective, and in achieving 
the objective there must be as little interference as possible with the right or 
freedom affected. Furthermore the limitation must be justifiable in the light of 
the objective. Of necessity value judgments will be involved. Ultimately, 
24 Above n 23, 15. 
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whether the limitation in issue can or cannot be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society is a matter of judgment which the Court is obliged to 
make on behalf of the society which it serves and after considering all the issues 
which may have a bearing on the individual case, whether they be social, legal, 
moral, economic, administrative, ethical, or otherwise. 
Step Five: After the Court has made the necessary determination under s5, it 
must indicate whether the limitation is or is not justified. If justified, no 
inconsistency with s5 arises, although there is, a limitation on the right of 
freedom concerned. If that limitation is not justified, there is an inconsistency 
with s5 and the Court may declare this to be so, although bound to give effect to 
the limitation in terms ofs4. · 
The Court of Appeal then considered the News Media case. First they 
considered the statement that "despite s14 (of the Bill of Rights Act 1990), 
censorship within the law prevails and the interpretation directions of s6 do not 
arise". The Court concluded that censorship within the law will prevail but the 
existence and extent of such censorship may indeed be matters to which s6 is 
relevant. The censorship provision must be interpreted so as to adopt such 
tenable construction as constitutes the least possible limitation on freedom of 
expression. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was a likelihood by 
reason of the Board's reference to, and its being bound by the decision of the 
Full Court in News Media, that the Board erroneously regarded Bill of Rights 
considerations as having no part to play. 
Under section 4 of the Human Rights Act if a court is satisfied that a provision 
is incompatible with a Convention right it may make a declaration of that 
incompatibility. However, a declaration under the section does not affect the 
validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of 
which it is given. Unlike the Human Rights Act, there is no specifically 
conferred power in the Bill of Rights authorising a judge to issue a "declaration 
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of incompatibility" where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the Bill of 
Rights and another statute. Emeritus Professor F.M. Brookfield, however, has 
suggested that, where a court has no alternative but to apply section 4 and 
uphold legislation which it thinks unreasonably limits a right, the court might 
nonetheless make a formal declaration that the right has been unreasonably 
limited in terms of the section 5 criteria. Cooke P expressed a slight reservation 
about this in Temese v Poiice25 saying the Court could be seen by some '"to be 
gratuitously criticising Parliament by intruding an advisory opinion". He went 
on to say, however, that "possibly that price ought to be paid", but it was 
unnecessary to discuss the matter further in that case. 
The Court of Appeal in the Moonen case appear to have resolved this issue. It 
seems that section 5 provides the basis for a declaration by the Court similar to 
that contemplated by section 4 of the Human Rights Act. Step Five in the Court 
of Appeal's approach to the application of the Bill of Rights stated that: After 
the Court has made the necessary determination under section 5, it must indicate 
whether the limitation is or is not justified. If justified, no inconsistency with 
section 5 arises, although there is a limitation on t~e right or freedom concerned. 
If the limitation is not justified, there is an inconsistency with section 5 and the 
Court may declare this to be so, although bound to give effect to the limitation 
in terms of section 4. 
The Court of Appeal stated:26 
It might be said that the potentially difficult and detailed process involved under s5 is 
somewhat academic when the provision in question is bound to be applied according 
to its tenor by dint of s4. Section 5 would have had more than persuasive effect if the 
Court had been given the power, as in Canada, to declare legislation invalid That was 
deliberately not done in New Zealand and the late introduction of s4 into the Bill of 
Rights was not accompanied by any express recognition of the remaining point of s5. 
25 (1992) 9 Criminal Reports of NZ 425. 
26 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (17 December 1999) W1reported, Court of Appeal, 
CA42/99, 11. 
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That section was, however, retained and should be regarded as serving some useful 
purpose, both in the present statutory context and in its other potential applications. 
That purpose necessarily involves the Court having the power, and on occasions the 
duty, to indicate that although a statutory provision must be enforced according to its 
proper meaning, it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, in that it constitutes an 
unreasonable limitation on the relevant right or freedom which cannot be justified in a 
free and democratic society. 
It seems that the interpretation sections of the two Acts achieve the same results 
but in different ways. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act appears to be 
equivalent to sections 4 and 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. At first 
glance it appears that the United Kingdom legislation provides an additional 
provision, that is, the ability for courts to make statements of incompatibility. 
However, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the Moonen case has established 
that section 5 of our Act gives New Zealand courts this right. 
IV REMEDIES 
The White Paper draft proposal for a Bill of Rights for New Zealand contained 
a remedies clause. Clause 25 stated: 
Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms - Anyone whose rights of freedoms as 
guaranteed by this Bill of Rights have been infringed or denied may apply to a court 
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and 
just in the circumstances. 
In the commentary to this clause it was noted that "in the great bulk of the 
situations covered by this Bill, the law and the courts will be able to provide a 
remedy from their present armoury" and that "Article 25 accordingly has a 
residual role". 
The provision encapsulates an important principle in our law - where 
there is a right, there is a remedy. What Article 25 does mean is that if a 
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court finds that a person's rights or freedoms under the Bill have been 
infringed, but there is no existing or adequate remedy available, the court 
will be able to grant any remedy which it considers appropriate and just in 
the circumstances. 
However, in the final version of the Bill, which became our current Act, the 
wide remedies clause was omitted. 
A Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's Case) 
In Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent 's Case/7 a majority of the Court of 
Appeal (Cooke P, Casey J, Hardie Boys J and McKay J; Gault J dissenting) held 
that a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 gives rise to a new 
civil cause of action in public law which lies directly against the Crown and 
may attract a remedy in the form of an award of monetary compensation. 
1 The Background 
The case involved a claim for damages arising out of the unlawful execution of 
a valid search warrant by the police. The plaintiffs alleged that the police had 
continued unreasonable and in bad faith, to search Mrs Baigent's house after 
they realised that her address had been mistakenly specified in the warrant and 
that the police target (a suspected drug dealer) had no connection with the 
prenuses. Mrs Baigent was not at home when the warrant was executed. 
However the pleadings alleged that Mrs Baigent's son and a neighbour both told 
the police that they had the wrong address. The son produced his passport as 
proof of his identity and telephoned his sister, who was a barrister. The sister 
told the detective constable that he had the wrong address and that the search 
was unlawful. It was alleged that the detective replied: "We often get it wrong, 
but while we are here we will have a look around anyway". The plaintiffs sued 
27 [1994] 3 NZLR 667. 
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the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown, claiming damages pursuant to a 
number of causes of action: negligence by the police in procuring the issue of 
the search warrant; trespass to land and to goods; abuse of process ( or 
misfeasance in a public office); and infringement of the right conferred by 
section 21 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 to be "secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure". 
2 The Decision 
The Court of Appeal was unarumous m holding that while the action for 
negligence must fail (malice being an essential element of an action for 
procuring the issue of a search warrant), the remaining tort actions should be 
reinstated. The Court held that neither the particular statutory immunities in 
favour of the police nor section 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act protects 
action taken in bad faith, and since the alleged facts supported an arguable case 
of bad faith the remaining tort actions based on the vicarious liability of the 
Crown should stand. 
But the real importance of the case lies in the decision of the majority of the 
Court to reinstate the independent civil claim for infringement of the right 
conferred by section 21 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. Since the Crown' s 
liability is characterised as a direct liability in public law founded on the Bill of 
Rights itself rather than a vicarious liability in tort for the acts of individual 
Crown servants or agents, it is unaffected by any statutory immunities from suit 
enjoyed by individuals, and is untouched by section 6(5) of the Crown 
Proceedings Act. 
3 The Majority 's Reasoning 
The rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights are basic human rights 
which are "fundamental to a civilised society". The courts are therefore 
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justified in adopting a "straightforward and generous", "liberal, purposive", 
''rights-centred" approach to interpretation of the Bill. 
The purpose of the Bill is revealed by its long title which declares that the Act 
1s: 
(a) To affirm, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New 
Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
Judicially enforceable remedies are necessary m order to ensure that the 
affirmed rights are "protected" and "promoted". This conclusion is reinforced 
by reference to the International Covenant, Article 2(3) of which requires each 
state party to ensure that persons whose rights are violated "shall have an 
effective remedy". Traditional common law remedies would often prove 
ineffective because the Bill does not impose "duties" capable of founding a tort 
action for breach of statutory duty, and some of the rights receive no recognition 
at all under existing private law doctrine. In any event, common law remedies 
"will often be so uncertain or ringed about with Crown immunity as to render 
them of little or no value". While the courts could always make a declaration 
that rights have been infringed, such a remedy would be ''toothless", and reduce 
the Bill to "no more than legislative window-dressing". The rights affirmed by 
the Bill are "intended to have substance and to be effective", and this requires 
provision of adequate judicial remedies to redress violations. 
The omission of an express remedies provision was "probably not of much 
consequence". The legislative history of the Bill of Rights Act was equivocal 
and of little value. It did not indicate an intention by Parliament to confine the 
courts to existing common law remedies. The best interpretation was that 
Parliament was content to leave it to the courts to provide appropriate remedies 
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for breach of the protected rights and "inclusion of a statement to that effect in 
the Act was unnecessary". 
The "fundamental" nature and international dimension of the affirmed rights are 
more important than the legal form in which they are declared. Consequently 
the reasoning of foreign courts interpreting entrenched constitutional guarantees 
of human rights is fully applicable to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
Hardie Boys J concluded:28 
Enjoyment of the basic human rights are the entitlement of every citizen, and their 
protection the obligation of every civilised state. They are inherent in and essential to 
the structure of society. They do not depend on the legal or constitutional form in 
which they are declared. The reasoning that has led the Privy Council and the Courts 
of lreland and lndia to the conclusions reached in the cases to which I have referred . . . 
is in my opinion equally valid to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act if it is to have 
life and meaning. 
Although in New Zealand the courts have got around the fact that the Bill of 
Rights contains no remedies provision, and New Zealand citizens now appear to 
be able to claim monetary compensation from the Crown for breaches of the 
Bill of Rights, the scope of the remedy is still very uncertain. In Upton v 
Green29 Tompkins J considered an argument that the plaintiffs rights under 
section 25 of the Bill of Rights (in particular, the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty, to present a defence, and to the observance of the principles 
of natural justice) had been infringed when he was sentenced to three months' 
imprisonment without having an opportunity to address the Court and make 
submissions before the sentence was imposed. Tompkins J held that for a 
person to be sentenced to imprisonment without having been given an 
opportunity to be heard was a clear breach of these rights. 
28 [1994]3 NZLR 667, 702. 
29 Unreported, 10 October 1996, High Court Christchurch, CP 91 /94. 
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Tompkins J referred to Baigent and asked whether public law compensation 
should be awarded. His Honour said ''the plaintiff is entitled to compensation if 
he can demonstrate that the events that occurred, resulting from the denial of his 
right, justify an award of compensation". His Honour added that in the case 
before him the issue was whether, and if so to what extent, the events that 
occurred, that is the sentence to three months' imprisonment, may have been 
otherwise if he had been heard. He added that if the result would have been the 
same, the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration, but no case for compensation will 
have been made out. This comment seems to suggest that a mere breach of the 
Bill of Rights that causes no damage will not sound in compensation; in such a 
case compensation will not be an appropriate remedy. 
Tompkins J concluded that although he could not reach any clear conclusion on 
whether, if the plaintiff had been fairly and fully heard, the result would have 
been different, there was a reasonable possibility that a lesser sentence would 
have been imposed. 
In Whithair v Attorney-Generat3° Eichelbaum CJ was asked to decide whether 
damages lay for a breach of a right in the Bill of Rights in the absence of any 
pleading of conscious violation of, or reckless indifference to, the plaintiff's 
rights under the Act. The Chief Justice rejected the argument that there was or 
should be such an additional requirement. His Honour could see no principled 
basis for circumscribing the damages remedy with some additional requirement. 
Thus, on the case law to date one must conclude that if there is no other 
effective and appropriate remedy for breach of the Bill of Rights, damages 
should in principle lie regardless of absence of fault. 
The absence of a generic fault requirement does not, however, mean that the 
defendant's state of mind will be irrelevant. Although much remains to be 
worked out, one can surmise that the more repugnant the defendant ' s state of 
30 [1996] 2 NZLR45. 
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mind, the greater the damages which will be awarded. The starting point may 
be that a rights-centred approach to infringement does not require a "guilty state 
of mind", such that damages are ( subject to the Court's discretion to refuse 
relief) available for a breach per se but if (additional) damages are awarded for 
reasons of deterrence, then questions of fault must be addressed. 
One of the many questions concerning the Baigent compensation remedy that 
still remains is whether the Crown is the only appropriate defendant and if it 
transpires that personal injury was suffered in circumstances where the 
government or public body breached the Bill of Rights, an important question 
becomes whether section 14 of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Act 1992 precludes an action for public law compensation under the 
Bill of Rights. 
Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides that 
everyone whose rights and freedoms are violated shall have "an effective 
remedy before a national authority" is not one of the Convention rights 
protected under the Human Rights Act. That is because the Human Rights Act 
"gives effect to article 13 by establishing a scheme under which Convention 
rights can be raised before our domestic courts"31 • This 'scheme' is section 8 of 
the Act which provides: 
(1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) ofa public authority which the court finds 
is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, 
within its powers as it considers just and appropriate 
(2) But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to award 
damages, or to order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings 
(3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the 
circumstances of the case, including -
(a) any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in 
question (by that or any other court), and 
31 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine ofLairg, at the committee stage of the Bill in the House of 
Lords, 583 HL Official Reports (5th series) col 475 (18 November 1997). 
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(b) the consequences of any decision ( of that or any other court) in respect of that act 
the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person 
in whose favour it is made. 
(4) In determining -
(a) whether to award damages, or 
(b) the amount ofan award 
the court must take into account the principles applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights in relation to the award of compensation under Article 41 of the 
Convention 
"The courts must take account of the large body of Convention jurisprudence 
when considering remedies ... Obviously, in doing so, they are bound to take 
judicial notice of Article 13, without specifically being bound by it"32 . 
Therefore, when courts and tribunals consider the scope and effect of remedies 
under the Human Rights Act 1998, they should proceed by reference to the 
principle that the Act is intended to implement the Article 13 guarantee of an 
"effective" national remedy. In deciding the criteria of an "effective" national 
remedy, courts and tribunals should have regard to the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
and the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to 
the award of compensation under Article 41 of the Convention. Those 
principles amount to little more than equitable assessments of the facts of the 
individual case. They are as follows: 33 
(I) There is no right to compensation. Compensation is awarded only if 'necessary' 
to 'afford just satisfaction' to the injured party. The E Ct HR adopts an equitable 
assessment and decides whether compensation is appropriate in the circumstances. 
(2) In relation to pecuniary loss, the E Ct HR sometimes states that it 'cannot 
speculate' as to whether the adverse consequences of which complaint is made would 
have occurred but for the breach of the Convention, or that it 'does not find it 
established that there existed a causal link between the matter found to constitute a 
violation and any loss or damage', and so it awards no compensation under this head. 
32 Above n 5. 
33 Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1995) p682-
688. 
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But the court is prepared to award compensation for pecuniary loss when it is satisfied 
that it is necessary to do so. 
(3) Similarly, in relation to non-pecuniary loss, the E a HR sometimes states that it 
' cannot speculate' as to whether the adverse consequences of which complaint is 
made would have occurred but for the breach of the Convention, or that, in any event, 
' in the circumstances , the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just 
satisfaction '. On other occasions, the court is persuaded to award ' a just and equitable 
amount of compensation ' for distress, disruption, lost opportunities of being released 
from detention, and other types of damage. 
(4) The E a HR has awarded interest on compensation where this is necessary to 
avoid unfair diminution in its value, but has not awarded exemplary damages. 
The fact that the Human Rights Act has an express remedies section 1s an 
improvement on the New Zealand position. It has been argued that having a 
remedies clause written into this type of legislation is restrictive and relying on 
the common law allows more flexibility. However, in the United Kingdom 
there is still significant flexibility as the remedies section has been drafted in 
very broad terms and regard must be had for the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights when considering remedies. 
V HORIZONTAL EFFECT ON PRIVATE COMMON LAW LITIGATION 
Despite the Human Rights Act's silence as to its possible impact on private law, 
a superficial examination appears to suggest that its basic scheme precludes 
direct horizontal effect. Section 6(1) states that "It is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with one or more of the 
Convention rights". That the Act is intended to bind public authorities only 
appears to be confirmed by section 7 and 8, which deal with proceedings and 
remedies only in relation to actions against such bodies. This basic intention 
was made clear by the Lord Chancellor during the Second Reading of the Bill 
when he said: "We decided first of all that a provision of this kind (making it 
unlawful to contravene a Convention right) should apply only to public 
authorities . . . and not to private individuals ... The Convention had its origins 
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in a desire to protect people from the misuse of public power by the state, rather 
than from the actions of private individuals".34 
But may a degree of indirect horizontal effect arise? A number of 
commentators have argued that some measure of horizontal effect must arise 
because the courts (and tribunals) are stated to be public authorities for the 
purposes of the Act35 and are therefore themselves bound to apply Convention 
standards in giving judgment even in cases involving only private individuals. 
To see what the possible effect may be it is helpful to look at the issue in 
relation to the New Zealand situation. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, like the Human Rights Act, includes the judiciary as a public authority 
which is subject to the Act. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act states: (I) It is 
unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right ... (3) In this section 'public authority' includes - (a) a court 
or tribunal . . . . Section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states: This 
Bill of Rights applies only to acts done - (a) by the legislative, executive, or 
judicial branches of the government of New Zealand . . . 
Andrew Butler argues that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act does apply to 
private common law litigation for three reasons:36 
First, the Bill of Rights applies to the common law, since the common law is an act of 
the judicial branch of the government of New Zealand, under section 3(a). Second, 
the Bill of Rights requires that a common law rule be set aside if it is inconsistent with 
any of the rights and freedoms contained in the statute. Third, the Bill of Rights does 
not suggest any exemption from compliance with its guarantees for private common 
law litigation. 
This approach appears to have been given tentitive support by Elias J in Lange v 
Atkinson37 when she stated: 
34 HL Deb vol 582 col 1232 3 November 1997. 
35 Section 6(3)(a) 
32 
ln my view, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protections are to be given effect by 
the Court in applying the common Jaw ... The application of the Act to the common 
law seems to me to follow from the language of s3 which refers to acts of the judicial 
branch of the Government of New Zealand, a provision not to be found in the 
Canadian Charter. 
Arguments in favour of exempting private common law litigation from Bill of 
Rights scrutiny tend to centre around comparison with the Canadian Charter 
which the Supreme Court found did not apply to the common law38 . However, 
as was recognised by Elias J in Lange v Atkinson, section 32 of the Canadian 
Charter, quite unlike section 3(a) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, contains no 
mention of the judiciary .. 
As the wording of the Human Rights Act is very similar to that in the Bill of 
Rights in this regard, there is a strong argument to suggest that private common 
law litigation will be subject to the Act and consequently the Convention rights. 
This view is somewhat strengthened by the fact that the Government resisted 
and amendment put forward by Lord Wakeham, chair of the Press Complaints 
Council, which would have had the effect of excluding the courts from the 
definition of 'public authority' when ''the parties to the proceedings before it 
[did] not include any public authority"39. Also of significance is the statement 
of the Lord Chancellor made in response to the amendment: " ... it is right as a 
matter of principle for the courts to have the duty of acting compatibly with the 
Convention, not only in cases involving public authorities, but also m 
developing the common law in deciding cases between individuals ... ". 40 
VJ THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR) 
36 Andrew Butler, ''The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Private Common Law Litigation" [ 1991 J 
NZLJ 261, 262. 
37 (1997] 2 NZLR 22. 
38 Retail, Wholesale & Department Stores Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd 32 DLR (4th) 176, (1986). 
39 HL Deb vol 583 col 771 24 November 1997, Amendment No 32. 
40 HL Deb vol 583 col 783 24 November 1997, Amendment No 32. 
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Unlike our Bill of Rights which requires that wherever possible an enactment 
should be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained within the Act itself, the Human Rights Act requires that legislation 
should be read and given effect in a way that is consistent with the Convention 
rights wherever possible. The Act itself does not contain the rights and 
:freedoms to be protected. 
The Act does not make the Convention part of English law in the sense that it is 
per se justiciable, the Convention will not override domestic legislation. Lord 
Irvine LC said41 : 
The ECHR under this Bill is not made part of our Jaw. The Bill gives the European 
Convention on Human Rights a special relationship . . . but it does not make the 
Convention directly justiciable as it would be if it were expressly made part of our 
law. 
Section Three provides: 
(I) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights. 
That is to say, the scheduled rights which are most, though not all, of those to be 
found in the Convention and its protocols. The Convention rights incorporated 
by the Act are as follows: 
Article 2: Right to Life 
Article 3: Prohibition of Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Article 4: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour 
Article 5: Liberty and Security of the Person 
41 Bringing Home the ECHR: DU 1997 I, 2. 
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Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial 
Article 7: Freedom from Retrospective Criminal Offences and Punishment 
Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life 
Article 9: Freedom of Religion 
Article 10: Freedom of Expression 
Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association 
Article 12: Right to Marry and Found a Family 
Article 14: Prohibition of Discrimination in Enjoyment of Convention Rights 
First Protocol: 
Article 1: Protection of Property 
Article 2: Right to Education 
Article 3: Right to Free Elections 
A Section Three 
Section Three is "the pivotal provision"42• It requrres domestic courts and 
tribunals to construe legislation, where possible, in a manner consistent with the 
Convention rights: 43 
This rule of construction is to apply to past as well as to future legislation. To the 
extent that it affects the meaning of a legislative provision, the courts will not be 
bound by previous interpretations. They will be able to build a new body of case Jaw 
taking into account Convention rights. 
Lord Cooke ofThorndon said44 : 
The clause will require a very different approach to interpretation on that to which the 
United Kingdom courts are accustomed. Traditionally the search has been for the true 
42 Lord Sleyn Incorporation and Devolution - a Few Reflections on the Challenging Scene ( 1998) 
EHRLR Issue 2. 
43 White Paper Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill CM3782 para 2.8. 
44 Hansard HLDeb Vol 582, 1272. 
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meaning: now it will be possible for a meaning that would present a declaration of 
incompatiblity. 
By contrast, Lord Wilburforce said: "Clause 3 does not really represent a very 
great advance on what is already the position under English law',45. 
"Convention rights are to be a compelling, even if not overriding, aid to 
interpretation." The words 'so far as it is possible to do so' are critical. They 
seem to supply a far stronger direction to courts than the domestic rule that any 
ambiguous domestic legislation should be construed so as to achieve 
compatibility with relevant Treaty obligations46• This approach is strengthened 
by the capacity of the courts to make a declaration of incompatibility when 
satisfied that a provision of primary legislation or subordinate legislation is 
incompatible with Convention rights (section 4). 
B Section Two 
Section 2 of the Act provides: 
(1) A court or tribunal detennining a question which has arisen under this Act 
in connection with a Convention right must take into account any -
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of 
the Convention, 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or 
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the 
Convention, 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal it is relevant 
to the proceedings in which that question has arisen. 
45 Hansard HLDeb Vol 582, 1280. 
46 Garland v British Rail [ 1983] 2 AC 751; Quazi-Quazi ( 1980) AC 744, 808; F.x p. Brind [ 1990] 1 
AC 748. 
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By section 2 of the Act, in carrying out the interpretive exercise, the domestic 
courts and tribunals are required to take account of relevant judgments, 
decisions, declarations and opinions of the various Strasbourg institutions. 
There is no hierarchy of the Strasbourg institutions in terms of potency. Lord 
Irvine LC said, "It is entirely appropriate that our courts should draw on the 
wealth of existing jurisprudence on the Convention',47• The key phrase is ' take 
account of. The judgments are relevant, not compelling, aids to 
interpretation.48• English courts could accordingly take a narrower or more 
generous approach. An amendment to make Strasbourg judgments binding was 
rejected in the House of Lords, precisely because it was recognised that this 
might impede the development of English citizens' freedoms49. "With the 
expansion of the European Union there are now a number of judges from 
jurisdictions which in the past have not been famous for their defence of human 
rights"50. 
Scepticism has been expressed about the utility of the Convention 
jurisprudence:51 
It may be said, and will be said, that the courts will have the benefit of decisions of the 
European Court itself and Commission - and of the new Court when it is set up under 
protocol 11. Clause 2 of the Bill says that account must be taken of any of their 
decisions. That will help a little, but one must not be too hopeful about it. Cases are 
dealt with by the European Court on a case-by-case basis in relation to particular facts 
and it is properly reluctant to go beyond individual cases. Some assistance may be got 
there. Even so, the judges in our country will be left with difficult decisions on these 
difficult and ambiguous phrases. 
47 Hansard, HLDeb 1997 Vol 582, 1299. 
48 Lammy Betten The Human Rights Act 1998 - What it Means ( Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 1999) 33. 
49 Hansard, 1997, Vol 583, 1268 - 71. 
50 Hansard, 1997, Vol 583, 1260. 
51 Hansard HLDeb 1997, Vol 582, 1281. 
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As the number of member states adhering to the Convention expands, the new 
Strasbourg Court, established under Protocol 11, will have a built-in tendency to 
compromise. "A domestic court, more homogenous in its personneL can sound 
a clearer note',52• In order to understand how the Convention rights are likely to 
be construed by the domestic courts and tribunals in the UK, it is necessary to 
understand how those rights have been interpreted and applied by the 
Strasbourg institutions. 
C Reliance on the Vienna Convention 
The basic principle of interpretation applied by the Strasbourg institutions is one 
grounded in a 'purposive approach' 53• As a treaty, the ECHR is interpreted in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Jacobs and 
White note, however, "although the ECHR is an international treaty, it has a 
special character which goes beyond merely setting out the rights and 
obligations of contracting states',54• 
Article 31 of the Convention provides that a treaty "shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose"55 . The words 
'in the light of its object and purpose' are at the heart of the purposive approach. 
Whereas the usual starting point for statutory interpretation of UK enactments is 
that the legislator intended the words of a statute to be given their plain and 
natural meaning (the literal approach), the Strasbourg institutions approach the 
construction of the Convention rights by first considering their aim 56. 
52 Lammy Betten The Human Rights Act 1998- What it Means (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 1999) 35. 
53 Golder Judgment of7th May 1974, Series A, No. 18. 
54 The European Convention on Human Rights 2ed, Oxford University Press 1997, Principles of 
Interpretation Ch. 3, 22. 
55 Series A 1978, Vol 29, para 46. 
56 Lammy Betten The Human Rights Act 1998- What it Means (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 1999) 37. 
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D The Object and Purpose of the ECHR 
The first indication of 'object and purpose' is to be found in the Preamble to the 
Convention which reaffmns: 
... a profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms, which are the foundation of 
justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective 
political democracy and on the other hand by a common W1derstanding and 
observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend. 
A second indication is the jurisprudence in which such object and purpose have 
been assessed. They were identified as ''the protection of individual human 
rights"57 and as the maintenance and promotion of ''the ideals and values of a 
democratic society"58. 
E The Public Order of Europe 
The ECHR's 'object and purpose' is also the basis for the conception of the 
ECHR as "an instrument of European public order ( ordre public) for the 
protection of individual human beings"59. This signifies that m the 
interpretation and application of the ECHR the overriding consideration is not 
that it creates "reciprocal engagements between contracting states" but that it 
imposes "objective obligations" upon them for the protection of human rights in 
Europe6°, with the ECHR evolving as Europe's constitutional Bill of Rights. 
The practical application of the purposive approach is best illustrated by the 
method adopted in Golder , the Court's first judgment in a case against the UK. 
In that case the Court considered Article 6( 1) which provides a "right to a fair 
57 Soering v UK, July 7 ( 1989) Series A, No.161, 11, EHRR 439. 
58 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pederson v Denmark December 7 (I 976) Series A, No. 23; l EHRR 
711. 
59 Loizidou Series A, No. 310, I 995. 
60 Jrelandv UK(I978) Series A, No. 25; 1992 EHRR25. 
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and public hearing". It was decided that, notwithstanding the lack of express 
clear wording, this Article did not mean only that where domestic law provided 
a hearing it had to be fair and public but also that it conferred a right to a 
hearing, and indeed of access to a court through a lawyer61 • 
The purposive principle also permits the meaning of the Convention rights to 
adapt and change according to the social norms of the Member States. This 
concept was articulated by the European Court in Tyrer v u62 in classing the 
Convention as "a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in the light of 
present day conditions". In Tyrer the Court considered whether three strokes of 
the birch imposed by an Isle of Man juvenile court on a 15-year-old boy 
constituted degrading punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. The 
Court expressly had regard to and was influenced by ''the developments and 
commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the Member States of the 
Council of Europe". The standards concerned were the Member States current 
standards, not those that existed at the time the Convention was drafted. In 
terms of the intention of the drafting states, the emphasis is therefore upon their 
general intention in 1950 (to protect human rig!lts) rather than any particular 
intention (e.g. as to the meaning of inhuman or degrading treatment) that they 
may have had. This approach described as "dynamic and evo lutive" permits the 
Convention to protect rights which have evolved over time as a result of 
developed social and cultural attitudes. 
F Dynamic or Evolutive Interpretation 
The Strasbourg institutions have, however, imposed limitations on the organic 
nature of the Convention. Whilst it is legitimate to construe the Convention 
rights in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention and with 
regard to contemporary standards, it is not possible to go so far in this process 
61 Pub!. ECHR ( 1987) Series A, No. 18. 
62 
( 1978) Series A, No. 26, para 31. 
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so as to create a new right under the Convention which was not intended to be 
incorporated as a right at the time the Convention was drafted. This limitation 
is illustrated by Johnston v lrelan~3 where the Court decided that the right to 
marry enshrined in Article 12 does not include a corresponding, but crucially 
different, right to divorce, despite the fact that the right to divorce is now well 
recognised in most of the Member States. As Judge Bernhardt said "Treaty 
interpretation must not amount to Treaty revision. Interpretation must therefore 
respect the language of the Treaty concemed',64. 
1 Standards in European national law 
The mam difficulty faced by the Strasbourg institutions by interpreting the 
Convention as a "living instrument" whereby regard is had to contemporary 
standards is in deciding what amounts to such a standard so as to justify 
protection under the Convention65 . Any consensus in the law of the contracting 
parties has a considerable impact on the interpretation of the ECHR.66 because 
the ECHR reflects European values that are followed by states at the national as 
well as the international level. In the absence of a European consensus, the 
tendency is to adopt a lowest common denominator approach or to 
accommodate variations in state practice through the principle of proportionality 
and the margin of appreciation doctrine. The result is that a state's conduct may 
escape condemnation if it accords with that of a number of European states67 or 
where European practice is widely varied68 . State conduct that is out of step 
with that of most other states is clearly at risk. 
(a) General principles 
63 December 18 (l 986) Series A, No. 112; EHRR 203. 
64 Bernhardt 'Thoughts on the interpretation of human rights treaties' in Studies in Honour of 
Wiarda ed Maatscher & Pezold Kluwer 1991, at 295. 
65 Marckx v Belgium June 3 ( 1979) Series A, No. 131; 2 EHRR 330. 
66 James v UK February 21 (1986) Series A, No. 98; EHRR 123. 
67 EHL v Austria (1987) Series A, No. 117; 10 EHRR 255. 
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The principles as well as the precedents of the Strasbourg organ will also 
necessarily be applied, indeed more so since the doctrine of precedent as such is 
alien to Strasbourg and to civilian systems generally:69 
The courts will no doubt strive as far as is judicially possible to save legislation from 
having to be declared incompatible, and hence to be amended by future further 
legislation. The courts will do so by construing present and future legislation as 
intended to provide the necessary safeguards to ensure fairness, proportionality and 
legal certainty as required by the Convention. 
(b) Fairness 
There must be procedural safeguards surrounding limitations on freedoms laid 
down in the Convention - although these may be influenced by Article 13, 
which is excluded from scheduled rights 70 • 
( c) Proportionality 
Whereas a few rights in the ECHR are absolute ( e.g. freedom from torture and 
freedom from slavery) most are. not. Limits may in effect set to absolute rights 
in the course of defining them. In deciding whether a restriction upon a non-
absolute right is permissible, the principle of proportionality is applied. 
Reliance upon this principle is most evident where the ECHR expressly allows 
restrictions upon a right. Thus, under the second paragraphs of Articles 8-11, a 
state may restrict the right concerned to the extent that this is 'necessary in a 
democratic society' for specified public interest reasons ( e.g. national security). 
This formula has been interpreted as meaning that the restriction must be 
"proportionate to the legitimate aim persued"71 • 
proportionality is found in Searing v U: 72 
68 H v Norway Appl. No. 17004/90 (1992). 
69 Lord Lester, Hansard, HLDeb 1997, Vol 582, 1240. 
70 See later section, "Remedies". 
71 Handyside v UK 3 December 1976 Series A, No. 24; I EHRR 737. 
72 (1989) Series A, No. 161; 11 EHRR 439. 
One expression of 
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. . . inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for the fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual's hlllDan rights. 
( d) Legal certainty 
The law, especially that which limits rights, must be accessible, clear and 
predictable in its application. 73 
( e) Effective interpretation 
The principle of effective interpretation is articulated in Artico v Jtal/4, a case 
where a lawyer provided by way of legal aid was totally ineffective: "the 
Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but 
rights that are practical and effective". 
(f) Margin of appreciation 
In general terms, the margin of appreciation doctrine means that a state is 
allowed a certain freedom of evaluation, the exercise of which is subject to 
supervision at Strasbourg, when it takes legislative, administrative or judicial 
action in the area of a Convention right. The standard of review by Strasbourg 
institutions was expressed as follows in a classic passage in the Handyside 
case75 in the context of a restriction upon freedom of expression in the interest 
of public morals: 
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, 
state authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give 
73 The Sunday Times v UK ( 1980) Series A, No. 24; I EHRR 245. 
74 13 May 1980 Series A, No. 37; 3 EHRR I. 
75 3 December 1976 Series A, No. 24; I EHRR 737. 
43 
an opinion on the exact extent of those requirements (of public morals) as well as on 
the 'necessity' of a restriction or 'penalty' intended to meet them ... 
Nevertheless, Article l 0(2) does not give the contracting states an unlimited power of 
appreciation. The Court, which with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the 
observance of those states' engagements, is empowered to give the final ruling on 
whether a 'restriction' or 'penalty' is reconcilable with freedom of expression as 
protected by Article l 0. The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision. 
The degree of discretion allowed to a state varies according to the context and 
depending on the nature of the rights and the nature of the restriction to be 
imposed. In Informationsverein Lentia v Austria76 it was stated: "35. The 
contracting states enjoy a margin of appreciation in assessing the need for an 
interference, but this margin goes hand in hand with European supervision, 
whose extent will vary according to the circumstances". 
A state is allowed a wide margin of appreciation in cases of restrictions upon 
rights involving national security or public morals; and generally where the law 
of the contracting parties varies widely; but an extremely narrow one in other 
areas. The doctrine of a margin of appreciation reflects the subsidiary role of 
the ECHR in protecting human rights. Member states enjoy the primary role in 
assessing the extent of Convention rights and the necessity for interference with 
those rights. The Commission and the Court are there to supervise their action, 
exercising a power of review that is akin to that of a federal constitutional court 
when it measures the conduct of legislative, executive and judicial organs of 
states within the federation against the standards of a national bill rights. In 
both contexts, the question is always how rigorous should be the supervision of 
state conduct. 77 
76 
( 1993) 17 EHRR 93, 112. 
77 Lammy Betten The Human Rights Act 1998 - What it Means (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 1999) 50. 
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It is accepted that the courts of Member states enjoy an advantage over an 
international court in adapting the law to suit the particular needs of society. 
Thus in James v United Kingdom78, the judgment stated: 
Margin of appreciation 46. Because of their direct knowledge of their society and 
its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international 
judge to appreciate what is 'in the public interest'. Under the system of protection 
established by the Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial 
assessment both of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures 
of deprivation of property and of remedial action to be taken (see Handyside v United 
Kingdom (1976) l EHRR 737, para 48). Here, as in other fields to which the 
safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a 
certain margin of appreciation . . 
The Human Rights Act has a special relationship with the European Convention 
on Human Rights which is very different to anything in the New Zealand 
context. As soon as the Act comes into force it will have a large, established 
body of jurisprudence that it can and must have regard to. This will greatly aid 
domestic judges, especially in the initial stages of interpreting the Act 
VII PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY 
Although it is purported to reconcile in 'subtle' form the protection of human rights 
with the sovereignty of Parliament, the Act also represents an unprecedented transfer 
of political power from the executive and legislature to the judiciary, and a 
fundamental re-structuring of our 'political constitution'. As such it is unquestionably 
the most significant formal redistribution of political power in this country since 1911, 
and perhaps since 1688 when the Bill of Rights proclaimed loudly that proceedings in 
Parliament ought not to be questioned or impeached in any court or any other place. 
In the words of Baroness Williams of Crosby, we have crossed our 'constitutional 
Rubicon', at least to the extent that the courts may now declare a statute incompatible 
with Convention rights.79 
78 8 EHRR 123, 142. 
79 ''The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy'' (1998) 62 MLR 79. 
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As mentioned earlier, as part of the debate in Britain over the introduction of a 
Bill of Rights quite some attention was paid to the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 as a praiseworthy model which protected fundamental human rights 
while at the same time retaining parliamentary sovereignty. It was also said to 
be "not subject to the excesses of which some complain in the case of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights". 
Has Britain, in following the New Zealand mode~ chosen the best model for 
protecting human rights at the same time as protecting parliamentary 
sovereignty? 
It has been argued that:80 
For those who support a bill of rights which is easy to operate, which enables 
Parliament to assert its sovereignty clearly and unambiguously with minimal potential 
for judicial frustration of its will, which demarcates the judicial role more 
satisfactorily, which augments domestic human rights protection in a meaningful way, 
and yet which operates within the parliamentary sovereignty paradigm, the Canadian 
Charter is the preferable option. 
The Canadian Charter guarantees much the same set of substantive civil and 
political rights as does the New Zealand Bill. As in the New Zealand Bill there 
is a provision which permits Parliament to impose justifiable and reasonable 
limitations upon the rights and freedoms which it guarantees (see sl of the 
Charter). There is no provision corresponding to s6 of the New Zealand Bill, 
though the Courts have tentatively begun to read statutes in a manner rendering 
them consistent with the Charter81 • Importantly, there is also no provision 
corresponding to s4 of the New Zealand Bill. But the Canadian Charter does 
not oust parliamentary sovereignty. The relevant provision is s33 , which reads: 
80 Andrew Butler, "The Bill of Rights Debate: Why the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is a 
Bad Model for Britain" (1997) 17 OxJLS 323, 341. 
81 See Butler ' A Presumption of Statutory Conformity with the Charter' ( 1993) 19 Queen ' s LJ 209. 
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-33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of 
this Charter82 ••• 
What are the advantages of this method of preserving parliamentary sovereignty 
over the New Zealand model? 
First, the Canadian Charter model is user-friendly. The structure of a Charter 
argument is very straightforward. The challenger demonstrates that his or her 
rights have been prirna facie infringed. The Government must then come 
forward with evidence and arguments showing that the legislation amounts to a 
reasonable limitation on the rights involved. The determination is left in the 
hands of the judges who can concentrate on the substantive merits of the case. 
Whether parliamentary sovereignty is a relevant factor is readily verifiable by 
checking the statute book for a declaration in terms of s33. 
Second, the s33 procedure clearly places the responsibility for trumping rights 
and freedoms on political shoulders. Parliamentarians can decide to trump the 
Charter (or at least parts of it) but they must do so explicitly and accept the 
public relations consequences of their actions. At the same time, when 
Parliament is so minded, its intentions are not susceptible to frustration at the 
hands of the judges. The mechanism is clear, the procedure is straightforward, 
and little discretion lies in the hands of the judiciary as regards the recognition 
of the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Third, the Canadian Charter provides a clear line demarcating the role of the 
Courts: their primary function is to act as guardian of human rights norms. 
They are not the primary guardians of parliamentary sovereignty: the 
82 Those provisions concern the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, assembly and 
association (s2), and legal (ss7-14) and equality rights (sl5). The rights sheltered from 
parliamentary trumping concern the vote and other democratic rights (ss3-5), mobility rights (s6), 
language rights (ss 16-23) and enforcement rights (s24). 
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legislatures themselves are. Finally, under the Canadian model parliamentary 
sovereignty is preserved but at the same time challenges can be made against 
statute law. Only those statutes which contain the override clause will be 
exempt from domestic judicial review. 
There have been signs from the New Zealand courts, and in particular from 
Lord Cooke, that the New Zealand Bill of Rights may not be successful in 
protecting parliamentary sovereignty in all situations and that the form which a 
bill of rights takes will not necessarily be determinative of whether the courts 
step in to protect individuals' fundamental human rights. 
In two judgments Lord Cooke has suggested that persons have fundamental 
common law rights which run so deep that Parliament may not lawfully intrude 
upon them. As a general proposition that suggestion first appeared in Fraser v 
State Services Commission in 1994 where, noting that natural justice required 
that a public official be told of allegations against him and be allowed to 
respond, Lord Cooke observed, "This is perhaps a reminder that it is arguable 
that some common law rights may go so deep that even Parliament cannot be 
accepted by the Courts to have destroyed them"83 • 
A few months later in Taylor v NZ Poultry Board a specific example of a 
fundamental common law right was given. The question was whether 
legislation should be interpreted to empower regulations requiring persons to 
answer questions even when their answers might incriminate them. In holding, 
as one of the two-judge majority, that the legislation did permit abridgment of 
the "right" not to be forced to incriminate oneself, Cooke J said: 84 
83 [1984] 1 NZLR 116. 
84 [1984] 1 NZLR 394. 
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I do not think that literal compulsion, by torture for instance, would be within the 
lawful powers of Parliament. Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that 
even Parliament could not override them. 
In a 1984 conference address shortly after the Labour Government had 
commenced work on a proposed Bill of Rights he said:85 
If ever a Government indifferent at heart to basic rights were to hold office in this 
country, it could force through, possibly in a matter of hours and by the barest of 
majorities, legislation opposed to basic principles of justice. Orthodox theory has in 
the past been that the Courts could not intervene. I am not so sure; the authority of 
Parliament itself - supremacy as it is often called - ultimately turns on judicial 
recognition. But a Bill of Rights would at least give the Courts confidence in a crisis. 
Although the Human Rights Act has made improvements on our Bill of Rights 
it may not have achieved its aim of protecting parliamentary sovereignty as 
effectively as it could have had it adopted the Canadian model. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
This research paper has shown that the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which 
was based almost entirely on our Bill of Rights Act, has not learnt from the 
problems we have faced under our Act and no significant improvements have 
been made. 
To its advantage, the Human Rights Act does have the support of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to help interpret the Act 
but the courts are bound to face many challenges as we have in New Zealand. It 
seems that the aim of retaining parliamentary sovereignty while at the same 
time protecting fundamental human rights and :freedoms could have been better 
achieved by following the Canadian approach. 
85 "Practicalities ofa Bill of Rights" [1986) Aust Bar Rev 189, 201. 
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